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COMMENTARY
ANTITRUST CRIMES: TIME FOR LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION
James P. Mercurio*
I. Introduction
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890 by a populist Congress
determined to break the power of industrial "trusts" that threatened to dominate
the nation's economic life. Conforming to the writing style of its day, the Act
was framed in sweeping, declaratory sentences, with alternative phrases designed
to cover all foreseeable contingencies. Section one proclaims the following:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.'
The Act provides the ordinary processes of the criminal law as an important
means of enforcement. Following the above-quoted proscription, § 1 declares
that "[e]very person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."' And § 2
makes it a misdemeanor to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."'
From the outset, it was recognized that the misdemeanors created by the
Act were not defined with precision; Senator Sherman explained this vagueness
during the floor debates on his antitrust proposals:
It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and
human experience, that is aimed at by the bill, and not the lawful and useful
combination.
I ad t that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between
lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to
determine in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is
declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will apply
them so as to carry out the meaning of the law.4
In the 85 years since the Sherman Act was passed, the courts, as Senator
Sherman foresaw, have determined "in each particular case" whether the
"contract, combination or conspiracy" was or was not "lawful and useful."
* Partner of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.; member, District
of Columbia and Missouri Bars; LL.B., 1964, A.B., 1963, University of Notre Dame.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26
Stat. 209).
2 Id.
3 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4 21 CONG. REc. 2457, 2460 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
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While these judicial determinations have not defined a "precise line between
lawful and unlawful combinations," they have produced a workable body of law
under the basic principle, first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,'
that only contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that restrain trade "un-
reasonably" are prohibited by the Act.'
Although the Act declared every violation of the Sherman Act a criminal
offense, it also provided for civil enforcement actions. In § 4, the Government
was given the power to obtain injunctive relief against violations of the Act;7 in §
7, private parties were given the right to recover "threefold the damages"
sustained by reason of a violation.' Thus, a violation of the Sherman Act might
be subject to a criminal prosecution, a government civil injunctive suit, or a
private damage action. Experience under the Act has demonstrated that only a
few kinds of violations are properly treated as criminal offenses, with their
drastic remedies of fine, imprisonment, and the social obloquy of criminal con-
viction.9 A great many antitrust violations are appropriately viewed as mere
antisocial conduct akin to that misconduct traditionally considered tortious
which, like negligent driving, requires a civil remedy in the form of damages
and, where appropriate, injunctive relief, but does not deserve condemnation
as a crime.
The Act, however, does not distinguish between criminal and civil offenses,
and thus the Attorney General has sole discretion as to which type of enforcement
action will be brought. His authority to institute a criminal prosecution, a civil
action, or to take no action at all in response to evidence of an antitrust violation
is not governed by any legal standards. By virtue of the extraordinary vagueness
inherent in the "rule of reason," the executive authority entrusted with instituting
criminal antitrust proceedings not only has the normal discretion of all prose-
cutors to decide which violations and which violators should be charged, but
in large measure has also the power to define the violation. The only legal check
on this authority is that the indictment must charge a restraint which a jury could
find "unreasonable." In short, the system for enforcement of the antitrust laws
presents the anomalous situation where the Congress has broadly condemned
as criminal a vast range of conduct of which only a portion is generally thought
to merit criminal punishment, and has left discretion with the Attorney General
to determine, without legal standards, which conduct in fact should be punished
criminally.
5 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
6 See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALB L.J. 775, 801-06 (1965).
7 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
8 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210. This section of the Sherman Act
was superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides treble damage actions for violations
of any of the antitrust laws of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (originally enacted
as Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731).
9 In congressional testimony, an attorney who formerly served in the Antitrust Division
as chief of the General Litigation Section recently has stated his belief that "[tihe antitrust laws
depend, for effective enforcement, outside of the local price fixing conspiracy problem, not
upon criminal cases but upon civil equitable relief." Hearings on S.782 and S.1088 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 136-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust & Monopoly Hearings].
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That this situation has not led to serious injustice results largely from the fact
that antitrust violations were classified as misdemeanors and generally have not
been punished with severe sentences. In December 1974, however, the Sherman
Act was amended; all violations are now felonies punishable by imprisonment of
up to three years and fines of up to $1 million for corporations, or $100,000 for
individuals. Moreover, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department-the
executive agency that proposed the amendment-and the Senators and Repre-
sentatives who supported it, have expressed hope that the increase in maximum
penalties would lead to sentences of greater severity than those imposed in
previous antitrust cases. Conviction of an individual for violating the Sherman
Act-for being a member of a "combination" that is found to be on the wrong
side of "the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations"-therefore
means not only a serious possibility of a substantial prison term and perhaps a
devastating fine, but also the certainty of disenfranchisement, disqualification for
public office, and all the other consequences that automatically follow from a
felony conviction. Since even the author of the statute admitted difficulty in
defining this "precise line," the possibility of injustice resulting from these severe
penalties is obvious.
II. Raising Criminal Offenses Under the Sherman Act to Felonies
Sherman Act violations were raised to the status of felonies by § 3 of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, which provides as follows:
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and com-
merce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July 2, 1890
(15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and 3), are each amended-
(1) by striking out "misdemeanor" whenever it appears and inserting
in lieu thereof in each case "felony";
(2) by striking out "fifty thousand dollars" whenever such phrase ap-
pears and inserting in lieu thereof in each case the following: "one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars"; and
(3) by striking out "one year" whenever such phrase appears and
inserting in lieu thereof in each case "three years" . . . .10
This Act grew out of several proposals, the principal purposes of which
were to revise and reform the procedure by which civil antitrust cases brought by
the Government could be settled by consent decrees.1' Prior to these proposals,
there had been a number of articles in the national press disclosing that a major
antitrust case brought by the Justice Department in 1970 against International
Telephone & Telegraph Corporation (ITT) had been settled by consent decree
following intensive "lobbying" by ITT officials. Many of these articles charged
that the settlement was unduly favorable to ITT and that the Government had
been influenced by ITT's large campaign contributions, as well as by a large
10 Act of December 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1708.
11 S. 782, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974); S. 1088, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
17063, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974); H.R. 9203, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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contribution made by an ITT subsidiary to the City of San Diego, the city in
which the Republican Party planned to hold its 1972 National Convention. 2
The proposed bill which ultimately formed the basis for the Act, S. 782, was
introduced by Senators Tunney and Gurney. It provided for publication of all
proposed antitrust consent decrees in the Federal Register at least 60 days before
entry by the court, along with a "public impact statement" outlining and
explaining the terms of the proposed decree and its anticipated effects on com-
petition. The bill further provided that all "materials and documents which the
United States considered determinative in formulating" the proposed decree be
filed with the court and made available to the public, and that before entering
the proposed decree the court must determine that its entry is in the public
interest.
As originally introduced, S. 782 contained no provision making antitrust
offenses felonies or changing the Sherman Act's prescription of a maximum
imprisonment of one year. It did contain a provision that would have raised the
maximum fine for Sherman Act offenses from $50,000 to $500,000, but had no
other provision relating to penalties. The primary intention of the sponsors of the
bill was to remedy the abuses that were likely to occur in consent decree negotia-
tions involving powerful, or at least wealthy, defendants. The ITT case was
considered a warning of the manner in which such defendants could corrupt an
antitrust settlement process left solely in the hands of the Attorney General.
Hearings on S. 782 and similar bills were held by the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee." As might be ex-
pected from the principal thrust of these bills, the discussions centered on the
consent decree provisions. The increase in the maximum fine was mentioned
only in passing." When it was discussed it was invariably supported on the
ground that the current maximum fine of $50,000, in effect since 1955, did not
reflect the enormous growth in corporate assets since then and had become a
meaningless penalty for large companies. The "consent decree bill," as it was
commonly known, passed the Senate in July 1973, and was sent to the House
with virtually no opposition to its sole, and uncontroversial, provisions dealing
with antitrust penalties. Hearings were thereafter held by the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the House Judiciary Committee; there, as in the
Senate, attention was focused on the consent decree provisions. 5 S. 782 was
12 See, e.g., Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1972, at A-i, col. 4; Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1972, at A-i,
col. 2; Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1972, at A-1 col. 3; Wash. Post, Feb. 29, 1972, at B-11, col. 1.
13 Antitrust & Monopoly Hearings, supra note 9.
14 See, e.g., id. at 58, 95-96, 150.
15 Only one witness in both the Senate and House hearings expressed any opposition to
the increase in fines. Professor Milton Handler, in his testimony before the House Committee,
questioned the effectiveness of the increase and pointed out the following:
We must bear in mind that, while the Department of Justice has discretion to proceed
either criminally or civilly, every violation of the Sherman Act is a criminal offense.
In many antitrust litigations the frontiers of antitrust law are extended, and con-
duct, which was thought to be legal before the litigation, turns out, after the Supreme
Court review, to be unlawful. The Court has not hesitated to overturn prior cases;
to alter its views of the scope and content of the antitrust laws; and to give our
antitrust statutes an expansive reading which vastly extend their reach.
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reported out of the committee on October 11, 1974, with an increase in the
maximum fine the only provision dealing with antitrust penalties.16
Before the bill reached the House floor, however, a series of events occurred
that substantially altered its penalty provision. On October 8, 1974, three days
before the committee report, the President delivered an economic message to the
Congress in which he called for an increase in the fine for Sherman Act viola-
tions to $1 million."7 This message was accompanied by a letter to the Speaker of
the House from the Office of Management and Budget, stating:
At the request of the President, I am transmitting for your considera-
tion and appropriate reference the following draft amendment, in imple-
mentation of the Economic Message delivered by the President before a
joint session of the Congress today:
To amend H.R. 17063 to increase the fine for Sherman Act violations
to $1 million for corporations and to $100,000 for individuals.
The President urges swift action on this proposal, which was referred
to in the Economic Message, before the close of the 93d Congress.'8
Three weeks later, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division gave a public address in Chicago in which he
announced that he intended to propose legislation making antitrust violations
punishable as felonies and increasing the maximum imprisonment to five years. 9
On November 1, 1974, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Repre-
sentative Rodino, wrote the Assistant Attorney General pledging his support
for this legislation and pointing out that "it may be that an amendment making
antitrust crimes felonies rather than misdemeanors is possible for the present
Congress."2  One week later, the Justice Department requested the House
Judiciary Committee to support an amendment to S. 782 that would make
Sherman Act violations felonies, instead of misdemeanors, and would increase
the maximum sentence to five years.2 '
On November 19, 1974, the bill was brought to the House floor. Repre-
sentative Rodino began the debate by announcing that the penalty provisions in
the bill reported out of committee had been amended in accordance with
the administration's request. Until this amendment, the only provision in the
bill dealing with penalties was the increase in maximum fine, which had gone
unchanged through the Senate and the House committee hearings. The first
I personally do not know how increased punishments can deter people from entering
into arrangements which were believed in good faith by them and experienced
counsel to be lawful at the time they occurred and which subsequently become
unlawful.
Hearings on H.R. 9203 and H.R. 9947 Before the House Subcomm. on Monopolies & Com-
merial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1973).
16 H.R. RxE. No. 93-1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
17 Address by President Gerald R. Ford, Joint Session of the 93d Cong., Oct. 8, 1974,
10 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1239 (1974).
18 See 120 CoNm. REc. H 10,760 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974).
19 Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, Mid-Winter Symposium of the Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Antitrust
Law and the Illinois State Bar Ass'n Section on Antitrust Law, Oct. 31, 1974.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 Id.
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speaker in the floor debate on the "consent decree bill" following Representative
Rodino, however, began his speech by noting that "[p]erhaps the most signifi-
cant provision [in the bill] is that which would increase criminal penalties."22
S. 782, as amended, passed the House after a short debate, was approved
by the Senate on December 22,2" and was signed into law by the President on
December 23, 1974. The President's statement upon signing the "consent decree
bill" began with the following:
I have signed S. 782, the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, which
will strengthen significantly antitrust laws and the ability to enforce them.
This legislation is the first major reform of the Nation's antitrust laws
in nearly 20 years. It changes such antitrust violations of the Sherman
Act as price fixing from misdemeanors to felonies; increases the maximum
sentence from 1 year to 3 years; and raises maximum allowable fines from
$50,000 to $1 million for corporations and from $50,000 to $100,000 for
individuals.
24
Thus, in little more than a month's time, an amendment to the Sherman
Act making all violations of the Act felonies was proposed, passed, and enacted
into law; and the President was pointing to this amendment, passed by the House
and Senate with little discussion and no debate, as a "major reform of the Na-
tion's antitrust laws."
III. The Need for Legislative Definition
The imposition of serious criminal punishments for business conduct con-
demned by the Sherman Act poses serious problems to fair and effective en-
forcement of the antitrust laws, unless a further legislative step is taken. Sup-
porters of the 1974 amendment making Sherman Act offenses felonies shared the
assumption that there exist certain well-defined antitrust offenses which are uni-
versally considered evil and understood to be criminal. Representative Hutchison
stated this assumption in the following terms: "One cannot unknowingly commit
a criminal antitrust violation. This increase [in penalty] is designed to deter
those who might conspire to fix prices or to monopolize a given market."25
Price-fixing was most frequently mentioned as an example of the kind of
antitrust offense for which felony treatment was necessary. In fact, the Presi-
dent's statement would lead one to believe that the new statute had carved out
price-fixing for special treatment. In explaining the amendment, he stated that
"[i]t changes such antitrust violations of the Sherman Act as price fixing from
misdemeanors to felonies."
26
22 Id. at 10,761.
23 120 CONG. Rac. S 20,861-65 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1974). Senator Hruska at this point
expressed concern about the vagueness of the Sherman Act as a criminal statute, and stated
that "[if violations of the antitrust laws are to be put in the class of felonies there must,
in all justice, be some qualification providing that only deliberate and intentional violations
are to be considerd criminal." Id. at 20,864.
24 10 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1600 (1974).
25 120 CoNG. REc. H 10,761 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974).
26 See note 24 supra (emphasis added).
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There is, however, no general understanding among lawyers, much less
among businessmen, as to which violations constitute a crime under the anti-
trust laws and which violations are not suitable for criminal punishment. Even
with respect to price-fixing, the most frequently cited example of criminal anti-
trust conduct, there is considerable question as to whether some concerted acti-
vities, such as exchanges of price information among competitors, constitute
"price-fixing,"2 and whether in all industries a system of self-regulated prices is
necessarily evil. For example, until the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar," many lawyers followed minimum fee schedules promulgated
by their local bar association without even considering that they might be corn-
mitting a felony.
The absence of consensus as to what conduct can be punished as a crime
under the antitrust laws raises a serious question whether the Sherman Act can,
consistent with constitutional standards of fairness, be enforced as a criminal
statute. This question was raised and decided in favor of enforceability in Nash
v. United States,2" an early prosecution under the Act. The offenses charged in
Nash consisted of a conspiracy in restraint of trade and a conspiracy to monop-
olize. In rejecting the argument that the rule of reason was "so vague as to
be inoperative on its criminal side," the Supreme Court stated the famous
dictum: "[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his esti-
mating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of
degree. 3 0
In decisions subsequent to Nash, the Court has shown more concern for the
problems raised by vaguely worded criminal statutes.31 Moreover, the more
than 60 years of experience under the Sherman Act since Nash has demonstrated
that the "reasonableness" of many business arrangements cannot be ascertained
with any degree of certainty unless lengthy inquiry into the economic circum-
stances surrounding the arrangement is made. The antitrust rule of reason, there-
fore, is objectionable not because it requires an estimation of a "matter of degree,"
but because it requires judgments in many situations in which a businessman is
forced to apply it that cannot be made with any assurance of correctness. It
thus is doubtful that anyone at present would seriously contend that the Sher-
man Act itself sets forth a standard of conduct sufficiently clear and precise to
impose severe criminal sanctions upon persons who fail to comply with it.
The Government itself, despite the Nash holding, recognizes the "poten-
tial unfairness" in the criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act without a
"firm rule" limiting criminal prosecution to "willful violations of the law."
Thus the Justice Department's Antitrust Division long ago adopted a policy for
27 See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n .v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
28 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
29 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
30 Id. at 377.
31 See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216
(1914). See also Bork, supra note 6, at 840-47.
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deciding in which cases criminal proceedings should be instituted. This policy
was restated in 1967 by a Task Force Report submitted to the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act is not unconstitutionally
vague. But an indictment in a particular case might unfairly attack con-
duct not known to the defendants to be unlawful. The solution of the
Antitrust Division to this problem of potential unfairness has been to lay
down the firm rule that criminal prosecutions will be recommended to the
Attorney General only against willful violations of the law, and that one of
two conditions must appear to be shown to establish willfulness. First, if
the rules of law alleged to have been violated are clear and established-
describing per se offenses-willfulness will be presumed. The most common
criminal violation of the antitrust laws is price fixing; upwards of 80 per
cent of the criminal cases filed charge conspiracies- to fix prices. The Su-
preme Court held more than 30 years ago that price fixing was a per se
violation of the law-one for which no justification or defense could be
offered. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Second, if the acts of
the defendants show intentional violations-if through circumstantial evi-
dence or direct testimony it appears that the defendants knew they were
violating the law or were acting with flagrant disregard for the legality of
their conduct-willfulness will be presumed.
32
The question remains, however, whether in defining criminal antitrust
conduct a prosecutor's policy can ever be an adequate substitute for
legislative definition, particularly when the conduct so defined is punishable
as a felony. Several considerations suggest that policy is not an adequate
substitute: (1) a prosecutor's policy can never achieve a level of public under-
standing that is comparable to the public understanding of a law enacted by the
Congress and openly interpreted by judicial decision; (2) reliance upon such a
policy to limit the criminal applicability of the broad prohibitions of the Sherman
Act has an inevitable "chilling effect" as businessmen refrain from legitimate
group conduct in the fear that the Government might decide to prosecute such
conduct as a crime; and (3) vesting such broad discretion in the executive
branch is a serious inroad upon the principle of separation of governmental
powers and results in an undue concentrafion of important legislative and execu-
tive power in the Attorney General.
A. The Lack of Public Understanding of the Antitrust Division's
Definition of Criminal Antitrust Offenses
The Antitrust Division has made the judgment that only "willful violations
of the law" should be subject to criminal sanction. In determining "willfulness,"
the Antitrust Division relies upon one of two presumptions. The first is that
willfulness "will be presumed... if the rules of law alleged to have been violated
are clear and established-describing per se offenses." The second is that, even
if the offenses charged are not covered by the various so-called per se rules,
32 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, CRimz
AND ITS IMPACT, AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967) (Presidential Task Force Report).
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"if... it appears that the defendants knew they were violating the law or were
acting with flagrant disregard for the legality of their conduct . . . willfulness
will be presumed." 8 The second "presumption" is nothing more than a defini-
tion of what is meant by willfulness. In effect, the Government's policy is to
prosecute as criminal only those cases in which the defendants appear to have
known that their conduct was a violation of the antitrust law and to apply the
commonly followed maxim, ignorantia legis neminem excusat, only in those
cases involving per se offenses.
This policy, however, is sound only if it is presumed that per se offenses
have been defined clearly enough to give businessmen fair notice of the con-
demned conduct. As explained previously,34 however, even with respect to hori-
zontal price-fixing among competitors (the conduct alleged in "upwards of 80
per cent of the criminal cases filed"), it is doubtful that there is a common
understanding of the kind of conduct that might be charged as price-fixing or of
the wrongfulness of this conduct in every circumstance. Other per se offenses
are generally said to include boycotting, allocation of customers, allocating of
territories, and tying agreements."5 There is considerable difference of opinion
on each of these offenses as to the precise nature of the conduct proscribed, as
well as to the proper applicability of the per se rule to all instances in which
the conduct may occur.3 6
Little basis exists, then, for concluding that the "willfulness" concept em-
bodied in the Antitrust Division's policy on criminal antitrust enforcement is
generally known or understood outside the Antitrust Division itself. Since this
concept lies at the heart of the Division's definition of antitrust crimes, it is doubt-
ful that many businessmen have any precise understanding of the conduct that
is criminally proscribed. The Sherman Act does not incorporate any element
of "willfulness.'""s Consequently, once an indictment is obtained by the Justice
Department-and it may be obtained without presenting any evidence of will-
fulness to the grand jury-an individual may be tried, convicted, and imprisoned
for three years without any judicial determination of willfulness.
A recent case in the Oregon district court, United States v. Champion
International Corp.,8 illustrates this point. A number of timber processing con-
cerns and their responsible executives were indicted for conspiracy to eliminate
competition among themselves for the purchase of timber from the United States
Forest Service. The evidence showed that prior to each public timber sale held
by the Forest Service in Portland during the four years preceding the indictment,
33 Id.
34 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
35 See generally Special Subcomm. of the Sherman Act Comm., The Per S6 Rule, 38
ANTrTRuST L.J. 731 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Per Se Rule]. See also Bork, supra note 6.
In 1969, the Attorney General requested legislation to increase the maximum fine for Sherman
Act violations. In his letter to the Speaker of the House, he described criminal violations of
the Sherman Act as "principally price fixing, boycotting, allocation of customers, and allocation
of territories." Antitrust & Monopoly Hearings, supra note 9, at 471.
36 Per Se Rule, supra note 35, at 731.
37 Two states have recently revised their antitrust laws and have limited criminal sanctions
to "willful" violations. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). MD. CODE
ANN. art. 83, ANN. § 11-204 (1975).
38 See, e.g., United State v. Champion Int'l Corp., Civil No. CR 74-698, at 6-7 (D. Ore.,
July 16, 1975).
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the defendants met and discussed their respective needs for the timber to be
offered at the sale. At the following sale, only one of the defendants would submit
a bid, while the others withheld theirs.
The case was tried without a jury, and on the facts outlined above, the
court found as follows:
Meetings between competitors are not illegal even when coupled with the
exchange of information about each participant's interest in upcoming sales.
A line must be drawn, however, between the exchange of interest and an
implied agreement to act on this information. The defendants crossed that
line. . . . I find that the defendants entered into an implied agreement:
to eliminate competition for these timber sales; to reduce the price paid for
these timber sales; and, to allocate these timber sales among themselves. At
the conclusion of each of the meetings described above, for example, it was
understood that the most interested buyer would purchase the sale. No one
really committed himself not to bid but in sale after sale over a four year
period, the one who had expressed the highest interest in a sale was the
one who took the sale without opposition. Where, as here, an operator's
existence depends upon his raw material supply, one would not likely pass
up a sale unless he knew that a subsequent sale would go to him.39
No finding of willfulness was made, and none was required. The defendants
were found guilty of entering into an "implied agreement," a criminal violation
under the Sherman Act.
The two individual defendants in Champion International were each fined
$5,000 and placed on probation. After the sentencing, one of these defendants
expressed complete bewilderment: "The government did not have any spelled
out rules for us to go by. There were no rules.... I still don't understand [the
antitrust laws]. I don't think anyone understands them."4
Whatever one might think of the credibility of a convicted defendant's
claim that he does not understand the law he has been found guilty of violating,
it must be admitted that no businessman would have made such a claim had
the charge been bribery, embezzlement, or virtually any felony other than an
antitrust offense. And whether this defendant was sincere or not, it cannot be
doubted that he believed he was saying something that would get a sympathetic
response from the business community. His statement indicates a feeling, which
a great many businessmen apparently share, that the antitrust laws are largely
inscrutable. Accordingly, the Antitrust Division's policy of prosecuting only
"willful violations" may have no meaning to many of the persons whose conduct
the Sherman Act is intended to govern.
No policy adopted within an executive department can be expected to
reach the level of understanding of a statute enacted by the legislative branch.
In the first place, such a policy is adopted without public discussion. The circum-
stances of its adoption and the meaning of its provisions to those who proposed,
supported, and opposed the policy are not disclosed. Second and perhaps more
importantly, all authoritative interpretations of its provisions are necessarily
39 Id.
40 BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. No. 727, A-11 (Aug. 19, 1975).
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and legitimately made in secrecy. While the indictments issuing from the Anti-
trust Division reveal the result of its deliberations, the public is never given a full
statement of the specific circumstances which the Division considered, or an
explanation of the reasoning used in reaching its conclusion. In virtually every
other felony case, the conduct constituting the offense is defined by statute so
that any questions concerning the definition of criminality can be judicially
resolved. Under the present system of criminal antitrust law, however, only ques-
tions regarding the outer limits of the statutory offense, that is, the boundaries
of the judicial standard of reasonableness, can be resolved by the courts. Once
a criminal prosecution is brought, the defendant has no way to obtain judicial
resolution of whether the conduct with which he is charged falls within the
narrow range of antitrust misconduct that Congress evidently intended to punish
as a felony.
B. The Undesirable "Chilling Effect" of Defining Criminal
Conduct by Executive Policy
The Sherman Act was designed to prevent businessmen from engaging in
certain kinds of group action. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
not all group action is prohibited; in fact, some kinds of group action among
business firms are socially beneficial and should be encouraged. Senator Sherman
recognized this in his remarks quoted previously,"' in which he explained that
the Sherman Act was not intended to inhibit "lawful and useful combination."42
The uncertainty as to the definition of criminal antitrust violations, which
stems both from statutory vagueness and lack of public understanding of which
violations are regarded as criminal, inevitably leads businessmen to forego useful
group activities in fear that a criminal charge might result. The address of the
Assistant Attorney General referred to previously in this article alludes to one
situation in which such forbearance commonly occurs: "When does exchange of
price information constitute proof of a price-fixing agreement?" '43 Although a sys-
tem of price exchanges was condemned under the circumstances alleged in United
States v. Container Corp. of America,44 in many marketing contexts an exchange
of prices and price-related information, such as sales, costs, and expenses, could
have economically beneficial results. The Bureau of Economics Staff of the
Federal Trade Commission recently pointed out some of the benefits flowing
from publication of such information. In a statement supporting the Commis-
sion's Line of Business program, under which the Commission intends to require
each of approximately 1,000 large corporations to submit sales, cost, and expense
data each year for each line of business in which they are engaged, the staff
explained as follows:
The purpose of the Line of Business program is to collect and publish in
aggregated form statistical information on economic performance in more
41 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
42 21 CONG. RsE. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
43 See note 19 & accompanying test supra.
44 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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than 200 industry categories for a sizeable sample of large corporations
active in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Such information, it is believed,
will have many important uses.... With it industrial decision-makers will
be better able to identify industries in which competitive entry has been
insufficient, thereby fostering a more rational allocation of manufacturing
industry resources. It will aid company executives in judging their own
organization's performance against industrywide averages and stimulate
below-average performers to greater effort. And it will provide investment
analysts and investors valuable information to consider in selecting invest-
ment opportunities.
45
If, as the Commission maintains, a statistical compilation of price-related
information gathered for certain lines of business on a national basis is in the
best interest of the public, other compilations of market prices and financial
information would also serve a desirable public objective. In fact, there are
decisions upholding the lawfulness of competing business firms joining together
in order to gather and publish such compilations. 46 There are other decisions,
however, in which such group activities have been deemed evidence of unlawful
conspiracy to tamper with prices."' For example, the holding in Container
Corporation might be read to suggest that in some circumstances the exchange
of prices in itself might be an unlawful combination if it has a price stabilizing
effect in the relevant market and serves no other purpose.4
For a businessman considering whether his company should join a program
of exchanging information with his competitors, the answer to the question
posed by the Assistant Attorney General-"When does exchange of price infor-
mation constitute proof of a price-fixing agreement?"-might thus depend either
upon the effect the exchange is subsequently viewed to have upon the market
or upon the unknown and unknowable actions and motivations of other com-
panies that participate in the exchange. A businessman considering whether
to join such a program is forced, therefore, to rely upon little more than guess-
work as to how his counterparts view the program and what effect the program
may have upon the market in which he operates. To require the businessman
to pay damages-even treble damages--in the event of a wrong guess seems
justifiable, for the ultimate question in damage cases is which party should bear
a loss that one of the parties must inevitably bear. In resolving this question,
the rule of reason provides an acceptable basis for decision. In criminal pros-
ecutions, however, the question is not one of allocating inevitable losses, but
whether the accused person should be punished for a failure to comply with
important social norms. No one should be forced to consider criminal prosecu-
tion as one of the "risks" involved in questionable conduct. Although perfect
clarity is impossible, the criminal law should be of sufficient clarity to allow a
sound judgment as to the lawfulness of contemplated actions. A standard like
the rule of reason, however, which can be applied only after exhaustive investi-
45 BUREAU oF EcON. STAFF, FEDERAL TRADE Comm., PROPOSED REVISION OF Foait LB,
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 1 (1975).
46 See note 27 supra; G. LAMB & S. KITTELLE, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE
60-70 (1956).
47 See note 27 supra.
48 393 U.S. at 337-39 (dissent of Justice Fortas).
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gation of circumstances, many of which occur or can be known only after the
event, makes sound judgment in many instances impossible. It seems neither
fair nor socially desirable to impose a risk of serious criminal punishment upon
persons who engage in group activities which, although open to some question,
might prove to be in the best interest of the public. Price information exchanges
are only one example of such activities, but it illustrates the undeniable "chilling
effect" produced by the uncertainty in the law stemming from the failure of
Congress to segregate and define those antitrust violations that deserve criminal
sanctions.
C. Undue Concentration of Legislative and Executive
Power in the Attorney General
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act grew out of a political atmo-
sphere of discomfort, if not outright distrust, concerning the Attorney General's
power to settle civil antitrust suits against major corporations. It was generally
feared that this power may have been abused in the case against ITT, or at
least that the existence of that power had resulted in questionable conduct, in-
cluding improper campaign contributions on the part of ITT. It is ironic,
therefore, that the same legislative act that was intended to curb the Justice
Department's unfettered power to deal with civil antitrust defendants should
itself vastly increase the power of the Department over criminal antitrust defen-
dants.
This increase constitutes a departure from the basic constitutional principle
that legislative and executive powers should be separated. The importance of
this separation of powers in criminal law enforcement is manifest. If the execu-
tive department, vested with the power to commence criminal proceedings,
should also possess unlimited power to define the offense, there is nothing the
accused person can plead to the court to show that his conduct did not con-
stitute a crime.
Under the present system for enforcement of the antitrust laws, the Attorney
General's power to define the offense, while not unlimited, is exceedingly broad.
A businessman could be charged with a felony should he enter into any agree-
ment which the Attorney General determines is an "unreasonable" restraint of
trade. This standard of reasonableness takes into account a host of consider-
ations. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,49 the Supreme Court listed
these considerations as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
49 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.
50
The standard of reasonableness is thus more a balancing test than a work-
able limit on the Attorney General's power to define antitrust offenses. The
immense power of the Attorney General to frame charges under this standard is
readily seen. In view of the corrupting effect of such power, as suggested by
the ITT settlement, its existence should not go unquestioned.
IV. Conclusion
In raising antitrust crimes to the status of felonies, Congress has only begun
the legislative work that must be accomplished to achieve an administration of
the antitrust laws that is both effective and fair. As the legislative history de-
scribed earlier demonstrates, the provision that raised the status of antitrust
offenses to crimes was inserted as a last-minute amendment to a bill, the primary
purpose of which was to regulate settlement of government antitrust civil suits.
The issues raised by vigorous criminal enforcement of the antitrust statutes have
therefore not been given the careful consideration they deserve. It might even
be questioned whether criminal enforcement is necessary in view of the avail-
ability of class actions to remedy public injuries caused by antitrust offenses. It
is clear, however, that after some 85 years of experience under the antitrust
law, the time has come for clear legislative delineation of the conduct which is
punished as criminal under these laws.
50 Id. at 238.
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